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Malpractice suits against attorneys have increased dramatically in the last decade.
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An Attorney's Liability to Third Parties:
The Expanding Field of Malpractice
Malpractice suits against attorneys have increased dramatically in the
last decade. In Florida, they have more than tripled in the last three
years alone (Chart 1). As a consequence of the overwhelming amount
of litigation resulting from such suits and the substantial judgments
awarded to winning plaintiffs, professional liability insurance premiums
for Florida attorneys have almost quadrupled since 1973 (Chart 2). This
expanding field of liability has become of justifiable concern to members
of the legal profession.
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Chart 1. Number of malpractice suits
brought against attorneys. (Courtesy
of Poe Insurance Company, Tallahassee
Florida.)
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Chart 2. Average yearly premiums for
professional liability insurance. (Courtesy
of Poe Insurance Company, Tallahassee,
Florida.)
[The authors wish to express their appreciation to Mr. Jack Driscoll, Poe Insurance
Company, Tallahassee, Florida, for his generous assistance in providing the statistical
data for the charts.]
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In this country, the overabundance of lawsuits against attorneys
has not emanated from clients alone, but also from third parties who
lack privity or any contractual relationship with the attorney. Although
the question of an attorney's duty to one other than his client has
already been settled in two leading jurisdictions, New York and Califor-
nia,' Florida only recently decided the issue as one of first impression. 2
Consequently, the question of an attorney's liability to third parties
remains a controversial and speculative issue.
The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of past and
current professional malpractice litigation by third parties as it has
occurred in other states, and to offer insight into the recent develop-
ments in Florida, including a discussion of related Florida statutes.
1. HISTORY IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Historically, there has been widespread agreement in the legal com-
munity that an attorney will not be held liable to third persons for acts
committed in good faith.3 Consequently, an attorney's negligence in the
performance of an obligation to a client will not provide a third party
with a cause of action against the attorney.4
Early in this century, the United States Supreme Court struggled
with the question of where an attorney's liability should end. In
National Savings Bank of the District of Columbia v. Ward,5 an attor-
ney negligently certified that his client held good title to a certain piece
of property when, in fact, the client had conveyed it to another individ-
ual. The bank, relying on the certificate, made a loan to the client. When
the client later defaulted on the loan payments and the bank discovered
it was unable to foreclose on the property, it brought suit against the
attorney, claiming he owed it a duty to make a careful title search.
After considering whether the bank was a beneficiary of the attor-
ney's actions, the Court ruled that the suit failed to state a cause of
action, since "[wihere there is neither fraud, falsehood nor collusion, the
obligation of the attorney to exercise reasonable care and skill in the
performance of a designated service is to the client and not to a third
I. See text accompanying notes 8-32 infra.
2. McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
3. 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 52 (1948).
4. Id.
5. 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
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party.' 6 This lack of privity proved to be a barrier to any actions the
bank sought to bring against the attorney. The case exemplified the
general principle that a person who is not a client can still be substan-
tially affected by an attorney's actions or advice. Therefore, it became
necessary to establish a realistic limit to the attorney's liability. Without
privity, the Court reasoned, no duty existed and, with no duty, no cause
of action could arise.7
In the years following Ward, privity again became a focal point in
determining the liability of individuals to third persons. Mr. Justice
Cardozo authored two often-quoted opinions which set the standards for
many courts.8 In the first, when faced with a plaintiff claiming to be a
third-party beneficiary to a contract, Cardozo stated that the require-
ment of privity in order to bring suit was a necessity, for to allow
otherwise would mean that "[e]veryone making a promise having the
quality of a contract will be under a duty to the promisee. . . but under
another duty apart from the contract, to an indefinite number of poten-
"2tial beneficiaries ... .
Two years later, the New York Court of Appeals heard the second
case involving an action brought against an accounting firm that had
negligently prepared a financial statement for an individual who had
applied to the plaintiff for a loan.1" In his complaint the plaintiff de-
manded damages, alleging that the firm should be liable because it knew
that creditors like the plaintiff would rely on the financial statement.
However, the court refused to allow the plaintiff to sue because he
lacked privity with the accountants. The court feared that allowing such
a suit would "expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."" The
court felt the "assault upon the citadel of privity" was growing at such
a rate that it had to be contained before the consequences of such suits
outweighed the remedy they sought to provide. 2 The danger Cardozo
foresaw-that of unlimited liability-has remained in the minds of
many courts to this day. The New York courts have remained steadfast
6. Id. at 198.
7. Id. at 199.
8. H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928);
Ultrameres Corp. v. Touche, Niven and Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
9. 159 N.E. at 899.
10. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441.
11. Id. at 444.
12. Id. at 445.
12:1978
3
et al.: An Attorney's Liability to Third Perties: The Expanding Field of
Published by NSUWorks, 1978
78 Nova Law Journal 2:1978
in their belief that attorneys should not be subjected to suits by third
parties lacking privity.
In Victor v. Goldman, 3 an attorney was sued by a relative of a
deceased client who claimed that the attorney negligently failed to
change provisions in the decedent's will, as the latter had instructed,
naming the plaintiff as the beneficiary of the right of first refusal to
purchase the decedent's estate. The court, in dismissing the case, stated
that "an attorney owes no duty to third parties for acts committed bona
fides in the performance of an obligation to his client . . . and this
remains the rule even where negligence results in damage to the third
party.""
Recently, a New York court reiterated its stand on attorney liabil-
ity in Drago v. Buonagurio,15 where a doctor who had been unsuccess-
fully sued for malpractice filed a countersuit against the attorney alleg-
ing that the action had been frivolous and that, due to the attorney's
negligence in failing to check out the facts, the doctor had been finan-
cially damaged. The issue at bar was whether an attorney who instituted
a frivolous malpractice suit on behalf of a client could be held liable for
damages to the doctor against whom he instituted the lawsuit. Deciding
that he could not, the court said:
The Courts of this state have consistently held that an attorney is not
liable for the negligent performance of his obligations to a client, even
where such negligence results in damage to a third party . . . and there
is no indication that such a rule would be adopted in this state.,6
To do so, the court feared, would unquestionably discourage the use of
the courts as a means of resolving conflicts, and thus be "contrary to
public policy."'17 Clearly, the New York courts believe that an extension
of an attorney's liability to third parties would be a fatal blow to the
attorney's role as advocate, since the fear of personal liability could
overshadow the attorney's duty to practice law in the best interests of
his client.
While New York clings to its long-standing policy of privity as a
requirement for attorney liability, California appears to have gone from
13. 74 Misc. 2d 685, 344 N.Y.S. 2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
14. 344 N.Y.S. 2d at 673.
15. 89 Misc. 2d 171, 391 N.Y.S. 2d 61 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
16. 391 N.Y.S. 2d at 63.
17. Id.
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one extreme to the other. In 1895, the California Supreme Court"8 held
that an attorney who negligently drafted a will would not be liable to
an injured beneficiary solely because he lacked privity of contract. The
court stated that the plaintiff was also precluded from bringing suit
under the theory that he was a third-party beneficiary, since the purpose
of the will was expressly for the client's benefit.19
However, the requirement of strict privity began to erode with the
case of Biakanja v. Irving.2" Here, a notary public, in preparing a will,
had failed to have it properly witnessed, rendering it invalid. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court reversed a lower court's dismissal of the case,
reasoning that the time had come to liberalize the privity requirements
by permitting a third-party beneficiary of a will to recover his losses."
As a means of controlling suits and the conditions under which they are
brought, the court stated that the allowance of such suits was "a matter
of policy and involves the balancing of various factors. . ."2 among
which are the extent of the intended benefit to the third party, the risk
of harm to him, the certainty of his injury, the proximity of the negligent
party's conduct to the injury, the moral blame involved, and the need
to prevent future harm.23
Although the Biakanja decision did not deal directly with attorneys
and third parties, it took the court only a short time to include attorneys
in the category of those who could be sued by third parties lacking
privity. In Lucas v. Hamm,24 the court determined that a beneficiary to
a negligently drafted will could make the negligent attorney answer in
damages for his mistakes. After listing the "balancing factors"25 it set
forth in Biakanja, the court held that such a cause of action could be
founded in either contract or tort.28 In addition, the court dealt with the
18. Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 P. 900 (1895).
19. 42 P. at 901.
20. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
21. 320 P.2d at 19.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
987 (1962).
25. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
26. 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824. The court held, however, that plaintiff's claim for relief
was not such as to allow recovery:
The complaint . . . alleges that defendant drafted the will in such a manner that
the trust was invalid because it violated the rules relating to perpetuities and
restraints on alienation * * * In view of the state of the law relating to perpetuities
12:1978
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question of whether extending privity could impose an undue burden on
the legal profession. Upon comparing the possibility of an undue burden
on attorneys with the probability of harm to an innocent beneficiary,
the court resolved the conflict by stating that "[s]ince, in a situation like
those presented here . . . the main purpose of the testator . . . is to
benefit the persons named in his will . . . this intent can [only] be
effectuated, in the event of a breach by the attorney . . . by giving the
beneficiaries a right of action. 27
In 1971, a California Court of Appeals~l extended the right to sue
to all third-party beneficiaries, in addition to those whose claims arose
from negligently drafted wills. In this case, the plaintiff had employed
a collection agency to recover a debt owed to him. However, the plaintiff
lost his chance to recover the debt when, due to the negligence of the
agency's attorney, the action was dismissed for lack of diligent prosecu-
tion. Although a lower court dismissed the case, the appellate court
ruled that the plaintiff had a cause of action on the theory that the
agency's attorney fully realized that his services were for the benefit of
a third party.2 1 In its opinion, the court stated that "an attorney may
be liable for damage caused by his negligence to a person intended to
be benefited by his performance irrespective of any lack of privity of
contract between the attorney and the party to be benefited.""0 The
decision paved the way for a multiplicity of lawsuits against attorneys
in that state and, at some point, limitations were required to reduce the
ever-rising number of malpractice actions.
In one case that reached the California Supreme Court, 3 an attor-
ney had negligently advised both his clients and the plaintiffs' attorney
that the sale of certain stock by his clients to the plaintiffs would not
be subject to a particular securities registration and tax regulation. The
plaintiffs purchased the stock, subsequently learned it was not exempt,
and restraints on alienation and the nature of the error, if any, assertedly made
by defendant in preparing the instrument, it would not be proper to hold that
defendant failed to use such skill, prudence and diligence as lawyers of ordinary
skill and capacity commonly exercise.
364 P.2d at 690, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 826. The third count was also held not actionable in
negligence. 364 P.2d at 692, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
27. Id. at 825.
28. Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal. App. 3d 769, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1971).
29. 19 Cal. App. 3d at 772, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
30. 19 Cal. App. 3d at 771, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
31. Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375
(1976).
Nova Law Journal 2:1978 1
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and, as a result, suffered heavy financial losses. In their case against the
attorney, the plaintiffs alleged that they were third-party beneficiaries
of the advice given by the attorney to his clients and, as such, it was
foreseeable that the negligently rendered advice would cause them in-
jury.
In a lengthy opinion, the court held that the plaintiffs were not
third-party beneficiaries and, more important, that the liability of an
attorney to third parties had discernible bounds.
The attorney's preoccupation or concern with the possibility of claims
based on mere negligence. . . by any with whom his client might deal
"would prevent him from devoting his entire energies to his client's inter-
ests." The result would be both "an undue burden on the profession" and
a diminution in the quality of the legal services received by the client.3"
2. FLORIDA DECISIONS
In 1976, Florida dealt with the issue of third-party liability in the
case of McAbee v. Edwards.33 Here, a trial court had dismissed a
malpractice suit against an Orange County attorney who, in response
to a request from his client, had failed to inform her that subsequent to
her remarriage certain provisions in her will would have to be altered
to ensure that her daughter would inherit her estate as sole beneficiary.
When the woman died and her second husband successfully claimed a
portion of the estate, the daughter brought suit against the attorney
alleging that his negligence prevented her from succeeding to the entire
estate. The attorney's main defense to the action was that even though
the plaintiff was a beneficiary, she lacked privity of contract with the
attorney and thus did not have standing to sue. Furthermore, he
claimed, a Florida attorney owes a duty only to his client.
In an opinion which indicated that this was a case of first impres-
sion, the appellate court squarely addressed the question of whether a
person without privity of contract may bring a malpractice action
against an attorney. The court's research led it through three California
cases34 which had decided this issue some years ago. Citing the Califor-
32. 18 Cal. 3d at 344, 556 P.2d at 743, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
33. 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
34. Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223,449 P.2d 161,74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969); Lucas
v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 987 (1962); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16; see also text accompa-
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nia opinions extensively, the court held that a third-party beneficiary to
a will can sue the attorney who drafted it, if his negligence resulted in a
loss to the intended beneficiary.35
The Florida court fully agreed with the California courts' conten-
tions that an attorney who is employed to draft a will takes on a rela-
tionship with the beneficiaries as well as his client, since it is readily
foreseeable that the purpose of the will lies more in benefiting the benefi-
ciary than it does in benefiting the client. Equally important, the court
felt, was the fact that an attorney holds himself out as one having
training and knowledge superior to that of the layman and, therefore,
assumes a duty to avoid the foreseeable consequences of his own negli-
gence.36 Unfortunately, the Florida Supreme Court was unable to rule
upon what could have been the test case for setting the state standard,
since the parties reached a settlement after the appellate court remanded
it for a hearing on the merits. But for now, the case stands out as an
indication of the direction which Florida courts may take in terms of
expanding the liability of attorneys. The bulk of the court's opinion in
this case was quoted from prior California cases, and it is puzzling why
the court failed to establish its position using existing Florida case law.
As will be evident below, had the court wished to do so, it could have
reached the same conclusion by other means.
3. THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES
The courts of this state follow the well-accepted rule that, when a
contract has been created solely for the benefit of the contracting par-
ties, a third party-even though he receives some incidental bene-
fit-cannot sue for the negligence of the parties in the performance of
their contractual duties." However, Florida has long recognized that
third-party beneficiaries have standing to sue on a contractual duty. As
early as 1887, the Florida Supreme Court stated that third parties could
bring suit where there was a "clear intent" for the third party to be
benefited.3" The mere fact that he might be benefited, held the court,
35. 340 So. 2d at 1170.
36. Id., citing Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225.
37. Muravchick v. United Bonding Ins. Co., 242 So. 2d 179, 180 (Fla. 3d DCA
1970).
38. Wright v. Terry, 23 Fla. 160, 2 So. 6 (1887), where Terry contracted with
Wright to have logs "driven" down a river to a designated place and, upon their arrival,
Wright was to pay Terry's employees for their work. Terry's employees were deemed
2:1978 1
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is not enough.39
In order for a plaintiff to bring a suit as a third-party beneficiary,
stated the court in Weimar v. Yacht Club Point Estates," his pleading
must allege that the contract was one created "expressly for his benefit
and one under which it clearly appears that he was a beneficiary."'"
Here, although the court pointed out that it was ii no way relaxing the
requirement of privity in order for a plaintiff to sue on a contract, it
found that the status of a third-party beneficiary was sufficient to create
the privity necessary for such an action.42 But the Florida courts have
placed definite limits on the types of people they consider to be third-
party beneficiaries. For instance, in the case of a plaintiff who was not
in privity with an abstract company,4 3 but relied on its title search, the
court held that "the liability of a title abstractor extended only to the
person employing him or one who is a party or privy to the contract of
employment"4 and not to a party who might subsequently rely on the
abstract.
In a more recent case,45 an action was brought against an account-
ant who had prepared a financial statement for lenders that was subse-
quently relied on by the plaintiff in making a loan. The plaintiff suffered
a loss and sued, alleging that the accountant was negligent in preparing
the statement. But the court of appeals held that in order for the plain-
tiff, a third party who had not employed the accountant, to recover from
the accountant, he had to show either that the accountant was guilty of
gross negligence or that he knew the plaintiff intended to rely on the
statement.
4 6
To date, the most far-reaching decision on third-party liability in
Florida was made in a case involving a contract between plaintiffs
employer and the defendant,4 7 whereby the defendant was to make
by the court to be third-party beneficiaries of the contract between Terry and Wright.
39. Id. at 8.
40. 223 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969), where a plaintiff homebuyer would have
been allowed to bring suit against a subcontractor who was involved in building the
home, even though the plaintiff's only privity lay with the general contractor, if the
plaintiff's pleadings had been drafted correctly.
41. Id. at 102.
42. Id. at 103.
43. Sickler v. Indian River Abstract and Guar. Co., 142 Fla. 528, 195 So. 195
(1940).
44. Id. at 198.
45. Canaveral Capital Corp. v. Bruce, 214 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968).
46. Id.
47. Gallichio v. Corporate Group Serv., Inc., 227 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969).
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safety inspections of a drydock. He conducted his inspections negli-
gently and, as a result, the plaintiff was injured. The court found the
plaintiff to be a third-party beneficiary of the contract and held that
"one who may foreseeably be injured by the negligent performance of
a contractual duty has the right to maintain an action against the negli-
gent performer, even though he is not in privity with the performer. '48
In matters involving beneficiaries under wills, it is apparent that
such persons fall into the category of third-party beneficiaries within the
meaning given to the term by the courts of this state.49 Unquestionably,
the intent of the contracting parties, the attorney and his client, is to
create an instrument capable of passing a portion of an estate into the
hands of the beneficiary upon the death of the testator. Moreover, it will
be clear on the face of the instrument that the concern of the contracting
parties is for the protection of those rights which they vested in the
beneficiary. In accepting employment to draft a will, the attorney also
undertakes a duty to ensure that the document is carefully researched
and skillfully prepared, so that the party's interests as a third-party
beneficiary will be protected. Thus, under existing case law, the plaintiff
in McAbee had the right to sue for the alleged negligent advice the
attorney had given his client.5"
4. THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE'S ATTEMPT
TO CONTROL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
In 1975, the Florida legislature took notice of the unprecedented
rise in malpractice litigation against physicians." Lawsuits had become
so numerous, and malpractice insurance rates so high, that an outcry
from both physicians and the public brought together a committee
charged with creating legislation to help relieve some of the economic
hardships physicians were facing. 5 The public's concern about doctors'
rising malpractice insurance premiums was the inevitable result of high
48. Id. at 521.
49. See Auto Mutual Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852, 856 (1938);
McCann Plumbing Co. v. Plumbing Industry Program Inc., 105 So. 2d 26, 27 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1958); Di Camillo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 122 So. 2d 499, 500 (Fla. 2d DCA
1960); Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Guitierrez, 325 So. 2d 416, 417 (Fla. 3d DCA
1976).
50. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
51. Medical Malpractice Reform Act, Ch. 75-9, 1975 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 13.
52. Id. at 14.
2:1978 1
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insurance rates, since, as rates went up, physicians passed the increased
costs on to their patients in the form of higher charges for services. But
insurance rates alone were not the cause of increased costs for medical
care. A large part of the problem was that doctors, in order to protect
themselves from the possibility of lawsuits, began practicing
"defensive" medicine-ordering extra x-rays and tests, or hospitalizing
parties who may have fared just as well if allowed to stay home."
The legislative committee, whose recommendations eventually re-
sulted in a far-reaching bill titled the "Medical Malpractice Reform
Act ' 5 (MMRA), included representatives of the Florida Bar, Florida
Medical Association, and Trial Lawyers Guild. Their goal was to organ-
ize a system of checks and balances that would reward legitimate suits
by patients, while limiting non-meritorious actions brought against
Florida physicians.-" The bill set up a study commission, a self-insurance
program for doctors, medical liability mediation panels, and a two-year
limitation on malpractice actions against physicians. An important fea-
ture of the section dealing with the statute of limitations was the state-
ment that such malpractice actions were limited to "the health care
provider and persons in privity with the provider of health care. 56
Buried deep within the bill was an amendment to an already exist-
ing Florida statute of limitations.5 7 The amendment created a new and
distinct category of parties whose liability would be regulated by the new
section and, more important, the amendment limited itself solely to
physicians and other professionals. Although the word "professional"
was left undefined in the statute itself, presumably the bill's sponsors
intended it to cover any person licensed by the state, including attor-
neys."'
The new statute is divided into two sections, the first dealing with
53. Id. at 15.
54. Id. at 13.
55. Id. at 16.
56. Id. at 20, 21.
57. FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (1975).
58. A "professional" act or service within malpractice policy is one arising out
of a vocation, calling, occupation, or employment involving specialized knowledge,
labor, or skill, and the labor or skill is predominantly mental or intellectual, rather than
physical or manual. Marx v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 183 Neb. 12, 157 N.W.2d
870, 872 (1961).
A "professional" is one engaged in one of the learned professions or in an occupa-
tion requiring a high level of training and proficiency. Reich v. City of Reading, 3 P.





et al.: An Attorney's Liability to Third Perties: The Expanding Field of
Published by NSUWorks, 1978
86 Nova Law Journal 2:1978
actions "for professional malpractice other than medical malpractice,"' 9
and the second for medical malpractice." It is the first of these sections
which is relevant to the present discussion, and it reads as follows:
95.11 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
(4) WITHIN TWO YEARS.-
(a) An action for professional malpractice, other than medical malprac-
tice, whether founded on contract or tort; provided that the period of
limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or
should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence; provided,
however, that the limitation of actions herein for professional malpractice
shall be limited to persons in privity with the professional.6
A problem as to the proper interpretation of the statute exists, because
it is not clear if it was intended to limit the liability of an attorney to
only those persons with whom he is in privity of contract.
In attempting to answer this question, the opinions of various attor-
neys in South Florida, 2 including those who had participated in the
drafting of the MMRA, were solicited. There was one common thought
linking the various interpretations of the statute: at some point during
the drafting of the privity requirement for physicians, it was felt that it
would be proper and justifiable to limit the liability of all professionals
by making privity a prerequisite to bringing a malpractice action. In
other words, under the statute, the intent of the draftsmen was to limit
an attorney's liability to third parties. The point of disagreement is
whether the wording of this section successfully carries out this intent.
Attorneys on one side of the issue feel that the phrase "the limita-
tions of actions herein for professional malpractice"6 means that the
privity requirement is applicable only when a negligent attorney is sued
under this particular two-year statute of limitations, but that a party
lacking privity could still bring an action under the more general four-
year "negligence" provisions of the statutes. That is to say, those who
59. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(a) (1975).
60. Id. at (4)(b).
61. Id. at (4)(a).
62. For the purposes of this section relating to the statute of limitations, the
attorneys interviewed requested that they not be named in the article.
63. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(a) (1975) (emphasis added).
64. "§ 95.11 Limitations other than for the recovery of real property.
(3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS.-
(a) An action founded on negligence."
12
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hold this view feel that the legislature's intent to limit actions against
attorneys to this section alone failed by the wording of the statute.
The opposing viewpoint is that the word "herein" is insignificant,
since this is the only place throughout the entire statute of limitations
where a section has been exclusively tailored to professionals. Therefore,
one who has a professional malpractice case is forced to bring suit only
under the professional malpractice section of the statutes and not under
the general "negligence" section. Those who support this interpretation
also point out that it seems illogical that a person in privity would have
only two years in which to bring an action, while one not in privity
would have four years. Why should a person without a contractual
relationship be allowed a longer period of time in which to bring a suit?
Some argue that the longer period is necessary, since a party not in
privity might not have the opportunity to discover the injury done to him
and, therefore, should be entitled to a longer time in which to sue.
However, the argument is moot in view of the general rule that statutes
of limitations begin to run when the injury is discovered or should have
been discovered. 5 Therefore, a party without privity is in no way disad-
vantaged and should not be given a longer period in which to bring an
action.
5. PRESENT STATUS OF THE LAW
Throughout this article, an attempt has been made to present a
broad overview of the historical development of a third party's ability
to sue an attorney for his negligent performance of a contractual duty.
Today this issue remains unresolved, as no uniform rule exists through-
out the country. Two leading jurisdictions, New York and California,
represent totally opposing viewpoints on the matter. New York courts
continue to take the position that under no condition will an attorney
be held liable to third parties; California insists that any legitimate
third-party beneficiary should have a cause of action against a negligent
attorney. Florida, in its first dealings with the subject, has followed the
lead of the California courts in permitting a third party to bring an
action. While these cases are representative of what has occurred in the
past, they do not necessarily reflect what future decisions the courts will
make. Will the courts strengthen the privity requirement so as to limit
an attorney's liability? Or will they abolish the privity restrictions in
65. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 144 (1971).
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order to ensure that anyone injured as a result of an attorney's profes-
sional negligence can bring a malpractice action?
6. FUTURE TRENDS
As one might expect, there is a definite split of opinion regarding
where the law is or should be headed, each view supported by socio-
economic as well as legal reasons. On the one hand, as Chief Justice
John Marshall stated in Marbury v. Madison," there is a strong consti-
tutional argument that every person who has been wronged is entitled
to a viable remedy through the courts. Marshall wrote: "The very ess-
ence of civil liberty consists in the right of every individual to claim the
[equal] protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of
the first duties of government is to afford that protection."6 Keeping
in line with the doctrine of Marbury v. Madison, the drafters of the
Florida Constitution have provided the citizens of this state with a
constitutional right "for redress of any injury, and justice . . . without
sale, denial or delay. 68
The innocent third-party beneficiary who is injured by the negligent
performance of an attorney acting on behalf of a client deserves the
opportunity to gain redress through the courts. If the law fails to provide
the injured third party with access to the legal system, he will then be
left abandoned and without a remedy. The California decisions and
McAbee show that the courts recognize the potential injustice that can
arise from such a situation and have begun to remove the age-old privity
requirement as to third parties in the same way that they have abolished
the privity requirement in other areas of the law. 9
Consider that, in cases involving the growing field of products
liability, the courts have recognized that a plaintiff who has been physi-
cally injured by a defective product may bring an action against either
the retailer or manufacturer of the product, regardless of whether privity
exists. 0 The law, in effect, now makes both retailer and manufacturer
strictly liable for defective products they sell, or produce, that result in
66. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
67. Id. at 163.
68. FLA. CONST., art. 1, § 21.
69. For instance, the concept of strict products liability no longer requires
plaintiff-consumers to be in privity with the manufacturer; see notes 70-72 infra.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 402A, B, Strict Liability.
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physical injury.71 However, at this point, the lifting of the privity re-
quirement has been extended to only those cases dealing with physical
injury, not with purely financial loss. 72 Logically, it seems that abolish-
ing the privity requirement where physical injury has occurred is only
the first step in abolishing the need for privity under other circumstan-
ces. Commercial loss can be just as devastating to an individual as a
physical disability, and the right to bring an action should be made just
as available. It is probably this attitude that has produced the California
and McAbee decisions.
The most serious concern of the courts, and perhaps the most valid
reason for limiting an attorney's liability to third parties, is protection
of the client. Should the scope of attorney liability expand, followed by
an inevitable rise in malpractice actions, the increased cost of these
lawsuits and judgments will be passed on to clients-much as physicians
have passed costs on to patients. Thus, the cost of malpractice insurance
for attorneys will ultimately be borne by the client. Of even greater
potential concern is the fact that the attorney who is placed in the
unenviable position of fearing personal lawsuits by third parties may
tend to become overconservative, because his apprehension over the
impact of his actions on third persons will have overshadowed his con-
cern for taking the course of action most likely to benefit his client. If
an attorney must focus upon interests other than those of his client, a
devastating blow is dealt to the adequate representation of a client's best
interests that an attorney is expected-and is under a duty-to pro-
vide.71
Ethically, the attorney who allows his representation of a client to
be constrained or altered by third parties is violating the very Code of
Professional Responsibility he has sworn to uphold. Canon 5, EC-5-I
states that "[t]he professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised,
within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free
from compromising influences and loyalties." In addition, the Canons
71. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976) (manufacturer
held liable to injured bystander); Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956)
(manufacturer liable to third party for negligent design); Marrilla v. Lyn Craft Boat
Co., 271 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973) (privity not required to maintain action against
retailer).
72. 336 So. 2d at 89.
73. "The attorney is under a duty at all times to represent his client and handle
his client's affairs with the utmost degree of honesty, forthrightness, loyalty and fidel-
ity." Smyrna Dev. Inc. v. Bornstein, 177 So. 2d 16, 18 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965).
74. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIrY, EC 5-1.
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point out that "[t]he obligation of a lawyer to exercise professional
judgment solely on behalf of the client requires that he disregard the
desires of others that might impair his free judgment."7 5 Should an
attorney suddenly be confronted with the threat of personal liability for
a decision he has made with the best interests of his client in mind, he
will surely, when faced with alternatives, choose the one least likely to
expose himself to a lawsuit by third parties. No longer may he act as
an undaunted advocate for his client's cause, or represent his client as
zealously as possible within the bounds of the law.
Last year, a Florida District Court of Appeal placed limitations on
an attorney's liability to third parties, using both pragmatic and ethical
reasoning. In the case of Adams v. Chenowith,6 the court concerned
itself with the issue of whether an attorney representing the seller in the
sale of a home owed a duty to the buyer. Here, the seller's attorney had
completed a closing statement using incorrect figures given to him by
the seller. The buyer was supplied with a copy of the statement prior to
the closing, but failed to confirm the figures himself and, as a result,
overpaid the seller. Upon learning of the overpayment, the buyer
brought an action against the seller's attorney, alleging that the attor-
ney's negligence in preparing the closing statement caused him subse-
quent financial injury.
The appellate court affirmed a lower court's dismissal of the case,
holding that the attorney owed a duty to no one other than his client.
In addition to the fact that this was an arm's-length business transac-
tion, the buyer had the opportunity to verify the closing figures on his
own. Moreover, the court pointed out that it was never intended for the
seller's attorney to represent both parties to the transaction, since to do
so would violate the Code of Professional Responsibility. Citing from
Canon 5, EC-5-14, the higher court agreed that an attorney may not
represent multiple clients with differing interests if such employment
would adversely affect the attorney's judgment on behalf of, or loyalty
to, a client.7" In holding that the interests of a seller and buyer in the
sale of a home are opposing interests that cannot properly be repre-
sented by the same attorney, the court said: "Here there are two sides,
two interests to be protected and we cannot hold a lawyer responsible
to all parties in a transaction .... ,,18
75. Id. at EC 5-21.
76. 349 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
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For members of the legal community, it is not hard to imagine the
burdensome impact an unqualified extension of third-party liability
could have upon attorneys and the courts. Besides the endless amount
of litigation that would result, such an expansion of liability could, con-
ceivably, severely cripple the basic foundation of the legal system by
preventing an attorney from trying to the best of his ability to represent
the view of the client.
No one can seriously contend that attorneys should be provided
with complete immunity for their actions. Attorneys must be made to
answer to the same system of justice they represent. Yet, at the same
time, logical and equitable restraints on a lawyer's personal liability,
particularly to third persons, must be established and enforced. Now
may be the time for the states to take an interest, as they have with
physicians, in controlling, directing, and limiting the actions that can be
brought against attorneys. Short of that, the courts must rely upon their
own precedent-setting authority to ensure that the legal system, and
those working within it, are given the opportunity to advocate the best
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